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Abstract 
The way age-specific unemployment rates fluctuate over the business cycle differs significantly across 
countries. This paper examines the effect of labor-market institutions on the fluctuations of age-specific 
unemployment rates based on panel data of 18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries between 1971 and 2000. Empirical results suggest that the cost of the 
business cycle disproportionately falls on youths in countries with stricter employment protection and 
higher union coverage. These results are consistent with a theoretical prediction that a higher adjustment 
cost of an existing workforce induces the employment adjustment of new entrants into the labor market.  
JEL classification: E24, J80. 
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Although the unemployment rate fluctuates in line with the business cycle, the fluctuation of 
age-specific unemployment rates differs significantly across Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. Figure 1 is a time-series plot for the age-specific 
male unemployment rate in the US, France, and Japan for the 1960-2008 period. The way 
age-specific unemployment rates fluctuate over the business cycle significantly differs across these 
three countries. First, youths’ (15-24) and adults’ (45-54) unemployment rates move in parallel in 
the US. Business-cycle fluctuations seem to be absorbed equally across generations. Second, youths’ 
unemployment rate fluctuates more sharply adults’ unemployment rate in France. This implies that 
employment adjustments occur more often for youths than for adults in France. The Japanese trend 
lies somewhere between those of the US and France. Shocks to the economy are equally absorbed by 
generations in the US, while they are intensively absorbed by younger generations in France. To see 
the heterogeneity of the age distribution of unemployment-rate volatility adjusting for the difference 
in the levels of unemployment rates by age groups, Table 1 reports the coefficient of variation of the 
unemployment rates for these three countries. Again, we find that the youths’ unemployment-rate 
volatility relative to adults’ employment-rate volatility is higher in France than in the US or Japan. 
What factors cause this international difference in the responses of age-specific unemployment rates 
over the business cycle? 
  Previous literature has shown that the youths’ unemployment rate is more cyclically sensitive than 
that of adults (Clark and Summers, (1981), Alba-Ramirez (1995), Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007)). 
Many theoretical and empirical investigations also account for higher unemployment rates for youth 
than for adults. Literature has shown that stricter employment protection or a higher unionization 
rate raises the unemployment rate of youths relative to adults (Canziani and Petrongoro (2001), 
Jimeno and Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2003), Bertola, Blau, and Kahn (2007), Kahn (2007), Modesto 
(2008)). These papers study how employment protection or wage-setting institutions affects the 
levels of unemployment rates of youths and adults. In other words, these studies examine the 
long-run effect of employment protection or wage-setting institutions on the unemployment rate of 
youths relative to that of adults.   
 To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing studies explain why the fluctuations of 
age-specific unemployment rates differ across countries. It is important to study which age groups of 
workers absorb the short-run macroeconomic shocks from the point of view of inter-generational 
risk-sharing. Economies where macroeconomic shocks are disproportionately absorbed by younger 
generations place more burdens of the business cycle on youths, who presumably have a lower 
capacity for absorbing risks because of a lower level of asset accumulation. Neumark (2000), von 
Wachter and Benders (2006), and Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010) report that the employment status 3 
 
of youths has prolonged effects on the employment status of adults because of the hysteresis of 
employment status over a life cycle. Thus, short-run macroeconomic shocks experienced when 
workers are young may well have a considerable long-run effect on their welfare, and workers 
belonging to different birth-year cohorts may have significantly different levels of welfare in an 
economy where short-run macroeconomic shocks are absorbed disproportionately by young 
workers. 
 This paper explores the extent to which labor-market institutions, such as the degree of 
employment protection, affect the heterogeneous responses of age-specific unemployment rates to 
macroeconomic shocks. We introduce a theoretical model that analyzes firms' employment policies 
in a dynamic setting when the adjustment of labor input is costly. Numerical results indicate that 
existing workers’ higher adjustment costs make firms adjust labor input by reducing new hires from 
the labor market. Our empirical analysis is based on panel data of the male unemployment rate of 18 
developed countries spanning the period between 1970 and 2000. By regressing changes of 
age-specific unemployment rates on overall unemployment rate, the heterogeneity of the responses 
of age-specific unemployment rates to a macroeconomic shock is estimated. We further examine 
how this heterogeneity depends on various labor-market-institution indexes, published by Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000) and others.   
 Our results indicate that stricter employment protection amplifies the effect of the cyclical 
unemployment rate on youths’ unemployment rate. This implies the cost of the business cycle 
disproportionately falls on youths in the countries with stricter employment protection and high 
union-coverage rates. Other institutions, such as the unemployment insurance system and the 
wage-setting institution, do not have significant impacts on the cyclical sensitivity of age-specific 
unemployment rates.   
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a simple model of a firm's 
decision to hire youth and adult workers and shows that the firing cost disproportionately insulates 
adult workers’ employment. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 4 describes our data. 
Section 5 reports the empirical results. Section 6 provides conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical background. 
 
In this section, we introduce a theoretical model that analyzes the firms' employment policy in a 
dynamic setting when the adjustment of labor input is costly.   
We consider a firm that operates infinitely, discounting future profit with a constant interest rate. 
The firm produces output using LY  young workers, and LO  adult workers as inputs. Young and 
adult workers are combined by the CES production technology with the elasticity of substitution 
σ  1 /   1 ρ : 4 
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where  A  is the total factor productivity, which takes either a high or low value and follows a 
first-order Markov process. We denote transition probabilities as PH|H,P L|H,P H|L,P L|L where P |  
stands for the probability of transition from state i to j. Hence, the firm has an incentive to adjust 
employment, responding to productivity realization in each period. We assume that the number of 
young workers in the previous period becomes the number of adult workers at the beginning of a 
period. The firm bears the labor adjustment cost when it decides to change the number of adult 
employmees from this initial value, as well as hiring costs for the young workers.   
 Given the wage rate of young workers WY , and adult workers WO ,, its profit in period t is 
represented as follows;   
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where  f .  is a hiring cost function for young workers and g .  is an adjustment cost function for 
adult workers. In the above setting, the firm’s employment policy must be consistent with the 
following Bellman equations, with the current state variables   A ,L Y    . 
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where  LY,    is the    number of youths employed in the previous period (initial old),  β  is a discount 
factor, and  A′  is productivity realization in the next period. 
We solve the model numerically with parameters in Table 2 and simulate the economies for 
10,000,000 periods. Specifically, we conduct them with three different sets of  σ,P  |  , each of 
which is calculated with three different values of α. We calculate the mean, standard deviation, and 
coefficient of variation (CV) of the simulated path of age-specific unemployment. Then, we 
calculate the relative CV between youth and adult workers. 
  Results are presented in Table 3. In the table, all three cases (a)-(c) show that with higher  α, the 
relative CVs of the young workers also mark a higher value. That is, the higher adjustment cost of 
existing workers makes firms adjust labor input by reducing new hires from the labor market. This 
inclination is more evident in the case of the higher substitutability of youth and adult workers 
(higher  σ) or lower uncertainty (higher  P | ).  
More volatile labor demand for youths leads to higher volatility of youths’ unemployment rate 
with some degree of rigidity in the wage setting (Shimer (2005a) and Hall (2005a)). In the following 5 
 
empirical sections, we test whether the higher adjustment costs of adult workers as compared with 
young workers results in a higher volatility of youths’ employment relative to that of adults. 
 
3. Empirical Strategy 
 
Theoretical analysis in the previous section emphasizes the role of adjustment cost on 
labor-demand fluctuation by age groups. The degree to which this demand fluctuation is transmitted 
to unemployment rate fluctuation crucially depends on wage rigidities. Thus, other labor-market 
institutions, such as unemployment-insurance systems, unions, and wage-setting institutions, which 
differ across countries, may well affect unemployment rates by age groups. Hence, we control for 
those labor-market institutions as well.   
The literature adopts labor productivity as a measurement of productivity shock to the labor market 
(Shimer (2005b), Hall (2005b), Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Fujita (2011)). Labor-productivity 
shocks, however, affect the unemployment rate through inflow to and outflow from unemployment 
with a complex lag structure. Accordingly, there is no consensus on a time-series relation between a 
positive shock to labor productivity and the unemployment rate. Given this state of the literature, we 
avoid directly estimating the relation between the labor-productivity change and the change of 
unemployment rates by age groups. Instead, the shock to the labor market is approximated by the 
unemployment rate defined over all age groups, and the relation between the overall unemployment 
rate and the age-specific unemployment rate is examined. Particularly, we specify a model as 
follows. 
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where the age groups of 15-24, 25-34, and 45-54 are indexed by age; countries are indexed by i; 
years are indexed by t.;  INS is the vector of seven labor-market institution indexes, which are 
normalized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1; Y/Pop is the ratio of 15-24-year-olds to 
45-54-year-olds; YA/Pop is the ratio of 25-34-year-olds to 45-54-year-olds.   
  In equation (1), the coefficient on the overall unemployment rate of all ages identifies the impact of 
the overall change of the unemployment rate on the change of the age-specific unemployment rate. 
The coefficients on lagged labor-market institutions identify the long-run effect of labor-market 
institutions, such as firing restrictions, on the age-specific unemployment rate change. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms between the labor-market institution index and the overall 
unemployment rate change identify how the effects of overall labor-market shock on the age-specific 6 
 
unemployment rates depend on labor-market institutions, such as firing restrictions, unemployment 
insurance, and wage-setting institutions.   
 Since the overall unemployment rate is the weighted average of age-specific unemployment rates, 
the overall unemployment rate is an obvious endogenous variable. This endogeneity is circumvented 
by instrumenting the overall unemployment rate by the weighted average of unemployment rates, 
excluding the unemployment rate of the target age group. We estimate the above equation with a 
random-effect IV model, assuming unobservable heterogeneity c
age
i is not correlated with regressors.   
  In addition, we run regressions with the difference of the unemployment rate change by age group 
as dependent variables to quantify the difference of the coefficients across age-groups.   
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We build the cross-country time-series dataset from two sources. First, we draw age-group-specific 
and overall unemployment rates and population for male workers from the OECD Stat Extracts.
2 
Age groups of our concern are 15-24, 25-34, and 45-54. Second, we draw labor-market-institution 
indices from the “CEP-OECD Institution Dataset,” which is compiled by Center for Economic 
Performance (London School of Economics). This dataset is constructed on the basis of an earlier 
work by Nickell and Nunziata (2001), which is in turn based on the OECD Employment Outlook 
and other related research.   
The CEP-OECD Institution Dataset contains the data of 20 OECD countries from 1960 to 2004. 
We restrict our sample to the 1970 to 2000 period of 18 countries, because some variables are not 
available for the whole period and all countries. First, year 2000 is the latest year of some indices for 
wage-setting institutions, which may have a potentially important role for employment fluctuations, 
that are available. Second, since there are no data of the union-coverage rate for Ireland and of 
population for Switzerland, we exclude these countries from the analysis.   
  Regression analyses are conducted with the following labor-market-institution indices: 
Employment Protection Legislation (hereafter, EPL) Index, Benefit Replacement Ratio Index, 
Benefit Duration Index, Union Density Ratio, Union Coverage Ratio, Bargaining Centralization 
                                                        
2 http://www.oecd.org 7 
 
Index, and Bargaining Coordination Index. Details of these indexes are summarized as follows.
3  
1.  The EPL Index takes a higher value if employment protection legislation is more stringent. This 
index is essentially based on Blanchard and Wolfers (1994), which in turn is based on OECD 
(1994) and Lazear (1990). Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) extend an EPL measure of OECD 
(1994) by connecting with Lazear (1990). In particular, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) use a 
measure named version 1, which is the longest series of the three measures published by the 
OECD. Here we only briefly explain the method for constructing the OECD’s (1994) version 1 
measure.
4 The measure is an unweighted average of the sub-indicators of regular and 
temporary contracts. These sub-indicators are aggregates of basis measures, which take a value 
of 0 to 6.
5  Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) constructed their EPL index for every five years, and 
then CEP (2006) interpolates them. The latest year of the index is 2003, when the US marked 
0.07, France marked 1.0, and Japan marked 0.6.   
2.  The Benefit Replacement Ratio  Index summarizes a benefit replacement ratio for various 
conditions. For many countries, the benefit replacement ratio depends on family structures and 
earnings before losing a job. The OECD calculates the replacement rates for the first five years 
of unemployment for three typical family structures and for two earnings levels, and takes the 
average of the figures. The latest year of the available index is 2003, when the US marked 13.8, 
France marked 39.4, and Japan marked 7.8.   
3.  The Benefit Duration Index captures the level of benefits available in later years of a spell 
relative to those available in the first year. This index is calculated as 
0.6*brr23/brr1+0.4*brr45/brr1, where brr1 refers to benefits of the first year, brr23 the second 
and the third years, and brr45 the fourth and the fifth years. The latest year of the available 
index is 2003, when the US marked 0.2, France marked 0.5, and Japan marked 0. 
4.  The Union Density Ratio (%) is a ratio of the number of union memberships over employment 
                                                        
3 Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2007) argue that it would not be appropriate to control for minimum 
wages, because the prevalence of unions may have a strong effect on the minimum wages, via the 
political process. 
 
4  See OECD (1994) and Nickell (2006) for more about the construction of version 1 of the EPL 
Index. 
5  For regular employment, there are 8 basis indicators (notification procedures, delay involved 
before notice can start, length of the notice period, severance pay, definition of justified or 
unfair dismissal, length of trial period, and compensation following unfair dismissal). For 
temporary workers, there are 6 basis indicators (valid cases for use of Fixed-Term Contract 
(FTC), maximum number of successive FTC, maximum cumulated duration of successive FTC, 
types of work for which Temporary Work Agency (TWA) employment is legal, restrictions on 
number of renewals, maximum cumulated duration of TWA contracts). See “Calculating 
summary indicators of employment protection strictness” 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/40/42740190.pdf) for details of these measures. 8 
 
population. The latest year of the available index is 2003, when the US marked 12.9%, France 
marked 9.8%, and Japan marked 19.7%. 
5.  The Union Coverage Ratio (%) refers to a ratio of a number of workers covered by collective 
agreements over employment population. The latest year of the available index is 2000, when 
the US marked 14%, France marked 93%, and Japan marked 18%. 
6.  The Centralization Index takes a higher value if the bargaining process is more centralized. 
Bargaining may occur at several different levels, and this fact features the degree of 
centralization. The index is taken from Table 3.5 of OECD (2004). 
 
1= Company- and plant-level predominant. 
2= Combination of industry and company/plant levels, with an important share of 
employees covered by company bargains. 
3= Industry-level predominant. 
4= Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level associations. 
5= Central-level agreements of overriding importance. 
  
    In these decades, there is no country in which bargaining processes became more centralized, 
while several countries, such as New Zealand, Switzerland, and Denmark, became more 
decentralized. 
   The latest year of the available index is 2000, when the US marked 1.0, France marked 2.0, 
and Japan marked 1.0. 
7.  The Coordination Index summarizes a degree of coordination in bargaining processes on the 
employer’s as well as the union’s side. The index takes a higher value if the degree of 
coordination is higher.
6  This index is taken from Table 3.5 of OECD (2004).   
 
1=Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no coordination by upper-level 
associations. 
2=Fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting, 
3=Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern-setting and moderate co-ordination 
among major bargaining   actors. 
4=a) informal coordination of industry and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak 
associations; 
b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored 
negotiations  
(tripartite agreements, social pacts), or government imposition of wage schedules; 
                                                        
6  “[D]egree of consensus between the collective bargaining partners” (OECD, 1997). 9 
 
c) regular pattern-setting coupled with high union concentration and /or bargaining 
co-ordination by          large  firms; 
d) government wage arbitration. 
  5=a) informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union 
confederation. 
    b) coordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage 
schedule/freeze,  with  a      peace  obligation.  
The latest year of the available index is 2000, when the US marked 1.0, France marked 2.0, and 
Japan marked 4.0. 
  In general, centralization may not necessarily mean coordination or vice versa (OECD, 1997). First, 
if there is a significant discrepancy between individual firm-level negotiated wage and globally 
negotiated wage, which is called wage drift, the extent of coordination may be weaker despite the 
centralized wage setting. Second, institutions such as pattern-setting may promote coordination, 
while it is also substitutable to institutions that are intended to promote centralization.
7 There are 
several different claims regarding the effect of centralization and coordination on unemployment 
rates. Nickell (1997) refers to the notion of OECD (1994, Table 5.16) that coordinative arrangements 
lower wages while centralized arrangements do not, and summarizes that the negative effects of 
unionization on employment are mitigated by coordination. In contrast, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
claim that the relation between centralization and employment is U-shaped.   
 Time-series, cross-section values of these indexes are summarized in Table 4. The indexes do not 
vary much over time within a country; thus the estimation mainly relies on the cross-country 
variation of labor-market institutions. The descriptive statistics of the analysis sample are 
summarized in Table 5. Since the values of the index of labor markets do not carry information in 
themselves, we normalize all the indexes for the purpose of comparing the relative importance of 
institutions in determining the change of unemployment rates. 
 
 
5. Estimation Results 
 
 Table 6 reports the estimation results of equations (1) and (2). Columns (1) through (3) report the 
results for age-specific unemployment rate changes, among 15-24-year-olds, 25-34-years-olds, 
45-54-year-olds, as dependent variables. Column (4) is the result with the difference of the 
unemployment rate change between 15-24-year-olds and 45-54-year-olds as the dependent variable. 
Column (5) shows the result with the difference between the unemployment rate change of 
                                                        
7  Pattern setting is a type of arrangement in which representative employers and unions act as 
de-facto leaders and their agreements are taken as a pattern for all negotiations in the same 
industry. 10 
 
15-24-year-olds and those of 45-54-year-olds as the dependent variable.   
 The coefficients of the overall unemployment rate are positive in each of the age groups. The 
estimated coefficients are larger for younger workers than adult workers, indicating that youths’ 
unemployment rate is more procyclical than adults’ unemployment rate.   
 Estimation results suggest that labor-market institution indexes, such as firing restrictions, 
unemployment system, and wage-setting institutions, are broadly irrelevant to unemployment 
fluctuation.  
  The coefficients of the interaction terms between institution indexes and the overall unemployment 
rate identify the heterogeneous impact of the macroeconomic shock on the change of age-specific 
unemployment rates by institutional setting. We first examine the results for employment protection. 
Table 3 shows that stricter employment protection amplifies the effect of overall shock on the 
unemployment change of young workers, while it has no effect on that of adult workers. This 
implies that firing restrictions mitigate the cyclical unemployment rate fluctuation for adults, while it 
does not for youths. These results are consistent with the theoretical result of the previous section. 
This also well explains why unemployment rates of all age groups move simultaneously in the US 
where firing restrictions are less stringent, while youths’ unemployment rate fluctuates more than 
that of adults in France, where firing restrictions are more stringent. 
 Notable results other than that of firing restrictions (EPL) are coefficients of the interaction terms 
between the overall unemployment rate and union coverage. The estimated coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant for youths’ unemployment rate change, but it is not statistically 
significant for adults’ unemployment change. Put differently, the higher union coverage amplifies 
the difference between youths’ and adults’ unemployment rate change in response to macro shocks, 
and this implies that macroeconomic shocks are more likely to be absorbed by young workers in 
economies with higher union coverage.   
 Given that younger workers are less likely to be employed and so are less likely to be covered by 
union contracts, the above empirical results are consistent with the result of Blanchard and 
Summers’s (1986) insider-outsider theory, where unions care about the employment of their 
members in the labor-bargaining process, resulting in fewer employment opportunities for outsiders.   
 These results imply that in economies with stringent firing restrictions or high union coverage, 
macro shocks are disproportionately absorbed by younger workers. This finding is also consistent 
with a robust findings that the role of seniority in determining the order of layoffs is greater in union 
sector than non-union sector (Abraham and Medoff (1984)). 
 The relative youth cohort size and relative young-adult cohort size are negatively correlated with 
unemployment rate of the young and both of them are statistically significant. These signs are 
consistent of Shimer’s (2001) finding that an increase in the share of youth significantly reduces 






  In this paper, we empirically explore the effect of labor-market institutions on cyclical variations of 
age-specific unemployment rates. A theoretical model with a numerical simulation suggests that a 
firing restriction has the heterogeneous impacts of a macroeconomic shock on the fluctuation of 
age-specific labor demand. In particular, a high adjustment cost of adult workers amplifies the 
cyclical variation of labor demand for young workers, while it mitigates the fluctuation of such 
demand for adult workers.   
 Our empirical analysis from 18 OECD countries shows that the firing restriction amplifies the 
cyclical fluctuation of unemployment rate for youths, but not for adults. This implies that 
macroeconomic shocks are disproportionately absorbed by younger workers than older workers in 
economies with the stricter firing restrictions. The other notable result is that macroeconomic shocks 
are more likely to be absorbed by young workers in economies with higher union density. 
  Previous literature has shown that youths’ unemployment rate is more cyclically sensitive than that 
of adults. Another strand of literature has shown that employment protection and wage-setting 
institutions tend to increase the long-run unemployment rate of young workers. On top of that 
existing knowledge, this paper adds a new finding that a stricter firing restriction and a higher 
coverage of workers by union contracts disproportionately insulates older workers from 
macroeconomic shocks at the cost of a fluctuation in younger workers’ unemployment rate. Our 
results suggest the importance of paying attention to intergenerational risk sharing in discussions 
about designing labor-market institutions.   
 Even if younger workers are more likely to absorb the cost of the business cycle, no particular 
generation incurs more cost than others if employment status is mobile over a life cycle. In contrast, 
if employment status during workers’ youth is persistent over a life cycle, the experience of 
unemployment at youth may significantly decrease the life-time welfare of a specific cohort. Hence, 
using cross-country panel data, calculating an average unemployment rate over the life cycle for 
each cohort, and examining how its inter-cohort variation depends on labor-market institutions are 
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Table 1: Coefficient of variation of the age-specific unemployment rate in three countries. 
15-24 25-34 45-54  15-24/45-54 25-34/45-54
France 0.49  0.572  0.58  0.84  0.99 
US  0.498 0.557 1.317  0.38  0.42 
Japan 0.216 0.355 0.729  0.30  0.49 
 
Table 2: Parameters of the dynamic stochastic labor-adjustment model 
Discount factor  β   0.98  
Elasticity of substitution between young and adult workers σ   2.0 or 1.0 
Parameter of adjustment cost of adult workers  α   0.005,0.010,or 0.015 
Parameter of hiring cost of young workers  γ   0.005 
Persistence of technology shock PH|H  P L|L   0.75 or 0.50 
 
Table 3: Simulation results 
  (a) Baseline case:  σ   2.0,P |    0.75 
   
Mean S.D.  C.V. 
Young Old Young Old Young Old  Young/Old 
α  0.005  0.3657 0.0819  0.055  0.0653 0.1504 0.7971 0.1886 
α  0.01  0.3475 0.1924 0.0723 0.0875 0.2081 0.4547 0.4576 
α  0.015  0.3466 0.2418 0.0748 0.0874 0.2158 0.3613 0.5972 
 
  (b) A case of less persistent shock:  σ   2.0,P |    0.50 
   
Mean S.D.  C.V. 
Young Old Young Old Young Old  Young/Old 
α  0.005  0.3657 0.0819  0.055  0.0653 0.1504 0.7971 0.1886 
α  0.01  0.3475 0.1924 0.0723 0.0875 0.2081 0.4547 0.4576 
α  0.015  0.3466 0.2418 0.0748 0.0874 0.2158 0.3613 0.5972 
 
(c) A case of lower substitutability between youth and adult:  σ   1.0,P |    0.75 
   
Mean S.D.  C.V. 
Young Old Young Old Young Old  Young/Old 
α  0.005  0.361  0.0725 0.1136 0.6291 0.1136 0.6291 0.1805 
α  0.01  0.3441 0.1871 0.0472 0.0534 0.1372 0.2855 0.4805 
α  0.015  0.3452 0.2406 0.0471 0.0517 0.1365 0.2148 0.6356 
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Table 4: Labor-market institution indexes (five-year intervals) 
Employment Protection Legislation Index 
Year  1960 1965    1970    1975    1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  2003   
Australia  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4  0.4 
Austria  0.73 0.73  0.63 
Belgium  1.07 1.07 1.07 0.73  0.73 
Canada  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27  0.27 
Denmark  0.77 0.77 0.47 0.47  0.47 
Finland  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.72  0.7  0.67 
France  0.57 0.84 0.93 0.93  1  1  1  1 
Germany  0.83 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.03 0.83  0.78 
Ireland  0.26  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3  0.37 
Italy  1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2  0.86  0.63 
Japan  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71  0.6  0.6 
Netherland 0.9  0.9  0.7  0.7 
New Zealand  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.5 
Norway  0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97  0.9  0.87  0.87 
Portugal  1.08  1.34 1.4 1.37  1.28  1.23  1.23 
Spain  1.33 1.29 1.27 1.27 1.04 0.97  1.03 
Sweden  0  0.23 0.86 1.17 1.17 1.17 0.83 0.73  0.73 
Switzerland  0.33 0.37  0.37 
United Kingdom  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.23  0.23 
US  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07  0.07 
Note: Index of strictness of employment protection legislation, which is increasing in the degree of employment protection legislation. 
Source: CEP (2006) 
Benefit Duration Index  Benefit Replacement Ratio 
Year  1960 1965    1970    1975    1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  2003 年  Year  1960   1965   1970   1975   1980   1985   1990   1995   2000   2003 年 
Australia  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.02  1  1  Australia  23.5 23.5 25.5  27  24.7 22.5 
Austria  0.71 0.7  0.72  Austria  32.5 32.2 31.6 
Belgium  0.8  0.78  0.76  0.79  0.86  Belgium  43.1 41.8 38.7 38.7 42.2 
Canada  0  0  0  0  0  0  Canada  18.1 19.3 19.3 19.3 15.3 15.1 
Denmark 0.62  0.61  1  0.9  0.8  Denmark  53.1  51.7  64.9  56  49.5 
Finland  0  0  0.66  0.65  0.51  0.5  0.56  0.56  0.58  Finland  4.2  6.7  23.9 25.1 34.4 36.4 35.8 34.1 35.7 
France  0.23  0.21  0.28  0.36  0.48  0.51  0.55  0.5  France  25.6 26.3 27.7 34.4 37.3 37.4 40.2 39.4 
Germany  0.57  0.62  0.62  0.6  0.6  0.59  0.6  0.6  Germany  29.4 29.1 29.7 28.3 28.2 26.3 28.2 29.2 
Ireland  0.42  0.43  0.5  0.75  0.88  1  Ireland  21.3  28.3 28.2 26.3 32.5 38.1 
Italy  0 0 0 0 0 0  0.44 0.45  Italy  2  1.9 0.8 0.4 2.6 19.3  34.3  33.7 
Japan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0  Japan  12.7  13.4 8.7 10.3 10 10.2  10.7 7.8 
Netherland 0.71  0.67  0.66  0.66  Netherland  54.3 52.3 52.5 52.6 
New Zealand  1.04  1.04  1  1  New Zealand  31.3 27.1 28.5 27.5 
Norway  0.37  0.49  0.49  0.49  0.51  0.6  0.38  Norway  7.6  24.5 38.8 38.8 38.8 41.7 34.4 
Portugal  0  0  0.05 0.33 0.38 0.52  0.46  Portugal  5.4  8  21.7  33  35.4  42.9  40.8 
Spain  0 0.1  0.25  0.25  0.44  0.42  0.41  Spain  21.3 24.6 34.4 33.7  39  37.1  36 
Sweden  0  0  0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04  0.03  Sweden  5.2  6.6  22  25.1  27.9  29.2  26.9  24  24.5 
Switzerland  0.16 0.3  0.2  Switzerland  29.5 37.4 33.1 
United  Kingdom  0.72  0.68  0.73  0.88  0.84  United  Kingdom  20.7 17.7 17.8 16.6 16.3 
US  0  0.16  0.17  0.23  0.17  0.15  0.21  0.16  0.21  0.2  US  7.1  9.1  10.3 12.1 13.1 14.7 11.2 11.9 13.5 13.8 
Note: Index of the level of benefits available in the later years of spell relative to those available in the first year.  Note: Average number across the first five years of unemployment for three family situations and two money levels (%)． 





Table 4: Labor-market institution indexes (five-year intervals), continued. 
Union Density  Union Coverage Ratio 
Year  1960  1965  1970   1975   1980   1985  1990  1995  2000  2003 年  Year  1960   1965   1970   1975   1980   1985   1990   1995   2000  
Australia 49.9  50  46.5  35.3  24.5  22.7  Australia  84  85  81.5  80.5  83 
Austria  41.1 36.5  Austria  98.8 98 
Belgium  52.4 53.9 55.7 55.6  Belgium  90 91.5  90.5 93 
Canada  34.9 35.4 34.4 33.8 30.9  30.2  Canada  38.5  39  38  35.3  32 
Denmark 78.2  75.3  77  74.4  70.4  Denmark  74 71  71.3  83 
Finland  38.3 51.3 65.3 69.4 69.1 72.3 79.2 76.2  77.4  Finland  95  95  95  94  95  94  94.7  93 
France  21.7 22.2 18.3 13.6 10.1  9.8  9.7  9.8  France  84  92  92.5  94.7  93 
Germany  32  34.6 34.9 34.7 31.2 29.2  25  22.6  Germany  90  90  87  90  86.5  88  68 
Ireland  55.3  54.1 51.1 47.1 37.8  34.7  Ireland 
Italy  37  48  49.6  42.5  38.8  38.1  34.9  33.7  Italy  88 85 84 85 83  82.2  83 
Japan  35.1 34.5 31.1 28.8 25.4  24  21.5  19.7  Japan  28  25.5  23  20.5  18 
Netherland 25.5  25.7  23.1  22  Netherland  73 84.7 83 
New Zealand  51  27.6  22.7  New Zealand  65 30.5 28 
Norway  53.8 58.4 57.5 58.6 57.3 54.3  54.1  Norway  65  71.5  70  71.5  70.5  73 
Portugal  59.7 54.6 31.7 25.4 23.5  Portugal  71.5  73.8  76  73  83 
Spain  8.9  11  16.3  13.9  14  Spain  65.5 70 74.5  78.8 83 
Sweden  66.3 67.7 74.5  78  81.3 81.5 86.6 80.3  78  Sweden  83  83.8  84.5  89.7  93 
Switzerland 22.9  19.4  Switzerland  51.3 43 
United  Kingdom  46.2 39.3 32.9 31.2  30.5  United  Kingdom  62 48.5  38.8 33 
US  30.9 28.2 27.4 25.3 22.1 17.4 15.3 14.2 12.9  12.3  US  29  27  27  24  23.5  21  18  16.5  14 
Note: Union density is defined as the ratio of union membership over total employment (%).  Note: Ratio of workers covered by collective agreements (%). 
Source: CEP (2006)  Source: CEP (2006) 
Bargaining Centralisation Index     Bargaining  Coodination  Index 
Year  1960  1965  1970   1975   1980   1985  1990  1995  2000  Year  1960   1965   1970   1975   1980   1985   1990   1995   2000  
Australia  4  4  2.8  2  2  Australia  4.3 4.2 2.8  2  2 
Austria  3 3  Austria  4 4 
Belgium  3 3 3 3  Belgium  4 4  4.3  4.5 
Canada  1 1 1 1 1  Canada  1.8  1  1  1  1 
Denmark  3  3 2.4 2  Denmark  3.6 3.4 3.6  4 
Finland  5  5  4.4  4.6  5  5  5  Finland  5 5  4.4  4.6  5 5 5 
France  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  France  2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Germany  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  Germany  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Ireland 4  1.9  3.4  4  4  Ireland  4  1.9  3.4  4  4 
Italy  2  2  2.9  2.6  2  2  2  Italy  2  2  2.9 2.6 2.6 3.6  4 
Japan  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  Japan  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Netherland 3  3  3  Netherland  4 4 4 
New Zealand  1.8  1  1  New Zealand  2.2 1  1 
Norway  4.5  3.9  4.1  4.5  4.5  4.5  Norway  4.5 3.9 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Portugal  4.4  3.4 3 3.6 4  4  Portugal  4.4  3.4  3  3.6  4  4 
Spain  4.4 4 3.7  3.2 3  3  Spain  4.4  4  3.7  3.2  3  3 
Sweden  5  5  4.7  3.6  3  3  3  Sweden  4 4  3.7  3.2  3 3 3 
Switzerland  2 2  Switzerland  4 4 
United  Kingdom  1 1 1 1  United  Kingdom  1 1 1 1 
US      1 1 1 1 1 1 1     US          1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: Index of the degree of bargaining centralization. The index is increasing in the degree of centralization.  Note: Index of the degree of bargaining coordination. The index is increasing in the degree of coordination. 
Source：CEP (2006)  Source：CEP (2006) 19 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics, 1971-2000 
   obs.  mean  s.d.  min  max 
Unemployment  rate  for  15-24   404  13.73   7.51   0.47   39.27  
Unemployment  rate  for  25-34  388  6.65   4.00   0.38   21.96  
Unemployment  rate  for  45-54  404  4.34   2.60   0.00   14.01  
Population 15-24 / Population 15-55 (%)  404  26.30    3.36    19.78    34.37   
Population 25-34 / Population 15-55 (%)  404  27.64    2.10    22.21    33.96   
Labor  productivity  404  239.82 737.04   9.10    4232.30 
Employment Protection Legislation Index（EPL Index） 404  0.00   1.00   -1.80   1.75  
Benefit  duration  ratio  404  0.00   1.00   -1.37   1.76  
Benefit  replacement  ratio  404  0.00   1.00   -2.00   2.66  
Union  density  404  0.00   1.00   -1.65   2.26  
Union contract coverage rate  404  0.00   1.00   -2.26   1.18  
Union  centralization  index  404  0.00   1.00   -1.34   1.86  
Union  coordination  index  404  0.00   1.00   -1.67   1.46  
Note: Each institution index is calculated as a deviation from the mean over the standard deviation for normalization.20 
 
Table 6: The impact of overall unemployment rate growth on the age-specific unemployment rate growth 
Independent variable :  Δ(Unemployment rate)age,t 
Macroeconomic shock:  Δ(Unemployment rate)age,t 
Estimation Method: Random Effects IV using  Δ(Unemployment rate)-age,t as IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




ΔUnemployment Rateall ages, t 1.78 1.03 0.64 1.10  0.39
 (0.065) (0.025) (0.024) (0.076)  (0.038)
Employment Protection Legislation t-1 0.07 0.01 -0.02 0.09  0.03
 (0.101) (0.040) (0.039) (0.116)  (0.059)
Benefit Duration t-1 0.08 -0.01 -0.03 0.11  0.02
 (0.082) (0.033) (0.031) (0.094)  (0.048)
Benefit Replacement Ratio t-1 -0.13 0.01 0.01 -0.15  -0.00
 (0.077) (0.030) (0.029) (0.088)  (0.045)
Union Density t-1 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.03  -0.02
 (0.063) (0.025) (0.024) (0.072)  (0.037)
Union Coverage t-1 -0.10 0.01 0.04 -0.14  -0.02
 (0.101) (0.040) (0.039) (0.116)  (0.059)
Centralization t-1 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.07  -0.02
 (0.100) (0.040) (0.038) (0.115)  (0.059)
Coordination t-1 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.03  0.01
 (0.090) (0.036) (0.035) (0.104)  (0.053)
Employment Protection Legislation t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  0.18 -0.01 -0.08 0.28 0.07
 (0.087) (0.034) (0.033) (0.101)  (0.051)
Benefit Duration t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04
 (0.072) (0.028) (0.027) (0.083)  (0.042)
Benefit Replacement Ratio t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  -0.17 0.08 0.07 -0.25 0.01
 (0.088) (0.034) (0.032) (0.103)  (0.052)
Union Density t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.05 0.03
 (0.053) (0.021) (0.020) (0.061)  (0.031)
Union Coverage t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  0.31 -0.00 -0.04 0.32 0.03
 (0.116) (0.046) (0.044) (0.134)  (0.068)
Centralization t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  -0.07 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.06
 (0.148) (0.058) (0.055) (0.174)  (0.087)
Coordination t-1×ΔUEall ages, t  -0.18 -0.09 0.05 -0.30 -0.14
 (0.157) (0.062) (0.059) (0.185)  (0.093)
Δln(15-24population) -7.93 0.36 -1.47 -6.28  1.79
 (3.871) (1.541) (1.482) (4.450)  (2.284)
Δln(25-34population) -5.32 -1.82 0.01 -5.18  -1.85
 (2.868) (1.142) (1.098) (3.298)  (1.692)
Constant -0.34 -0.15 0.08 -0.42  -0.23
 (0.249) (0.099) (0.095) (0.286)  (0.147)
Observations 363 363 363 363  363
Number of countries  18 18 18 18  18
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Each institution index is computed as the deviation from the mean over standard 
error. All specifications include year dummy variables. 